Practicing neurosurgery in a community west of Boston came after studying and
training in four cities. The geographic cycle had come full circle,
Born and raised in and outside of Boston, undergraduate studies in
Cambridge, medical school in St. Louis, general surgical training in
Baltimore and neurosurgical residency in Boston, work in
Stockholm both as a medical student and as a physician.
The two most intense years in my career came during service in the United States
Army in Asia during The International Armed Conflict in South Vietnam.
The following is very much a work in progress as I reflect on my life and
the times during which I practiced neurosurgery both as a civilian and
as an officer in the United States Armed Forces. This text is a rough
draft that will be often revised until I am satisfied that the finished
narrative is the best I can produce.
Many of the graphics are heart-wrenching and horrible to behold, but they are pictures
of some of the best young men of that generation.
The draft notice arrived in May of 1967, shortly before my thirty-fourth birthday.
I reported to an army facility in South Boston for a physical examination and
was pronounced fit for service. I was ordered to report to Fort Sam Houston
in San Antonio, Texas in August.
The International Armed Conflict in Vietnam was continuing with no clear end in sight.
Doctors were needed and the draft provided them. The previous year 3,692 were commissioned.
The numbers would gradually decrease as our nation disengaged from the conflict,
2,229 in 1967, 1,126 in 1968, 246 in 1969. The draft ended in 1973.
The total number of U.S. military members killed in The International Armed Conflict in Vietnam
from 1959 through 1975 was 58,169.
At the time of the dedication of The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall in 1982 only 57,939 names appeared. The time span for inclusion on The Wall then extended from November 1, 1955 to May 15, 1975. As of May, 2018 there were 58,320 names on The Wall.
In April, 1966 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had proposed
constructing a "fortified barrier" south of the Demilitarized Zone
(DMZ), the line of demarcation between North and South Vietnam, to
interrupt supplies of men and material from North Vietnam. It seemed
like a good idea. During the summer of 1966 forty-nine prominent
academics, including some of our nation's best scientists, had gathered
at Dana Hall, a private girls school in Wellesley, Massachusetts and
produced the Jason study. The study concluded that our current reliance
on air power and the bombing of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong sites
were having limited effect on the enemy's infiltration. They finally
endorsed McNamara's proposal for a one hundred mile electronic fence
that would impede enemy advances from the north.
On September 7, 1967 at a press conference in Washington, DC, Secretary
McNamara announced plans for building that electronic barrier. It would
extend from the South China Sea to the Laotian border with roads and
trails monitored by high-tech electronic equipment. Khe Sanh would be
the linchpin of this barrier defense. The Secretary of Defense's
announcement came when I was back in Boston after completing my
training at "Fort Sam" and before deploying to the 249th General
Hospital outside Tokyo, Japan.
The project began despite opposition from General Westmoreland and other
army officers. The principal purpose of this "McNamara Line" was to
sound the alarm when the enemy crossed the barrier. Allied firepower in
the form of air and artillery strikes would rain down upon the People's
Army of Vietnam (the North Vietnamese Army) in order to curb
penetration from the north. This McNamara Line was an attempt to merge
modern technology with one of the oldest defensive techniques in
warfare. The United States would unfortunately learn that more than
sophisticated technology was necessary to make an effective barrier.
The project was begun, but it turned out to be impractical and was
eventually discontinued.
On September 3, 1967, four days before Secretary McNamara's Washington
press conference, Nguyen Van Thieu was elected President of South
Vietnam and Nguyen Cao Ky Vice-President. During these events in the
summer and fall of 1967 I was making the transition from civilian to
military life. Also in September General Westmoreland began to fortify
Khe Sanh
Caring for patients and raising a family had consumed most of my time, energy
and attention since entering medicine. I had been practicing
neurosurgery and worked primarily as an attending surgeon at the
Framingham Union Hospital and as a clinical associate at the
Massachusetts General Hospital where I had trained. I knew only vaguely
about the conflict in Southeast Asia. I had paid little attention to
the news from those distant lands. I began a course of self-instruction
to understand what I would soon be experiencing. Current events were to
become quite important in my life. During the two years that the
selective service system required physician-draftees to serve I would
become more knowledgeable about both the political and the military
challenges facing the nation.
I had been happily surprised when orders came through assigning me to
Japan after the month of training in Texas. I knew that the evacuation
of gravely wounded soldiers from Vietnam was a multi-tiered process and
Japan was in that stream of traffic. I also knew that there were ten
military neurosurgeons in South Vietnam and that yearly tours of duty
meant that twenty replacements would be needed before my own two year
deployment was completed.
The conflict was escalating, and with the increase in hostilities there was
an increase in casualties. In 1965 there was only one army hospital in
Japan and that facility at Camp Zama had 100 available beds. By 1966
there were four hospitals, including the 7th Field Hospital (400 beds),
the 249th General Hospital (1,000 beds), and the 106th General Hospital
(1,000 beds). The U.S. Army Hospital at Camp Zama had increased the
number of its beds from the original 100 to 700. It was in the summer
of 1967 that I drove to San Antonio, Texas for an introduction to the
military and basic training at the Medical Field Service School and
Brooke Army Medical Center before assuming responsibilities for the
neurosurgical care of soldiers wounded in what was called the
International Armed Conflict in Vietnam.
The view of Fort Sam Houston as we approached in a helicopter while
transporting a severely wounded soldier from the 249th General Hospital
later in my tour of duty.
Fort Sam Houston provided a four-week overview of the military and the
practice of army medicine. It was a very relaxed and low-key
experience. Certain aspects of the training seemed quite unnecessary
but the weeks of instruction necessarily had to follow a one-size fits
all program. Among our group were all the medical specialties:
internists, dermatologists, general surgeons, psychiatrists,
ophthalmologists, obstetricians, pediatricians, and on and on. Our
assignments after Fort Sam would be worldwide, from stateside to
Europe, the Far East, South East Asia, wherever our nation had army
installations.
It was at Fort Sam that I acquired some historical background of the
facility that had been established in 1876. More recently, in May of
1962, one of the first military units sent to Vietnam from San Antonio
was the 178th Signal Company. Twelve medical units shortly followed. In
1967 medical training reached its peak with the graduation of
29,000 from the Medical Training Center.
The common experience shared by my classmates was that we were all
qualified to practice medicine. Most were younger than I. Most had
experienced long work hours and the responsibilities of caring for ill
patients. But the transition from civilian to military practice was
going to be a jolt, especially for those who would be practicing in the
combat zone.
Because of the large number of our entering group there was insufficient
housing on base. We were billeted in local motels, posh compared to the
quarters located on base. Outside my room was a swimming pool and the
weather during the length of my stay in Texas was ideal for unwinding
and relaxing before turning in for the night. Another unanticipated
benefit was the equestrian stable with horses available for
recreational riding in the afternoons after classes and training were
completed. I took advantage of as many free late afternoon hours that I
could to enjoy riding the extensive grounds of the installation. The
Artillery Post Stables had been moved from West Point in 1955 and were
included in the United States Modern Pentathlon Training Center.
We received a clothing allowance that covered the basics and early on we
purchased the required uniforms. A number of approved civilian
tailoring companies had contracts with the army and they were on the
base to outfit us with the necessities. We were fitted for the Class A
and Class B uniforms, green coat and trousers, long-sleeved tan shirts
and trousers, four-in-hand black neckties, dress blue uniform, head
gear, black shoes, boots, insignias.
The dress blue uniform seemed quite inappropriate. When were we going to
wear it? In my case it turned out to be only once during the next two
years. That one time was for an early morning inspection when the
entire class stood in formation for inspection. After my tour of duty I
gave this uniform to a recently drafted plastic surgeon with whom I had
worked during my years of residency on the neurosurgical service at The
Massachusetts General Hospital. With the hostilities gradually
subsiding I hoped that John would have more use for the dress blues
than I had. At the PX I purchased a copy of The Officer’s Manual of
1967-1968 in which I read the regulation that introduced me to one of
the many things I came to know as “the army way.”
“The Army Blue uniform is the prescribed uniform for officers and warrant
officers for social functions after retreat. Its wearing may be
prescribed by local commanders for specific occasions. On other
appropriate occasions it may be worn as desired by the individual. All
officers and warrant officers are required to own the Army Blue uniform
for wear on appropriate occasions, except Reserve Component officers in
a Reserve status or on active duty for training for periods of 6 months
or less. They may purchase the Army Blue uniform on an optional basis.”
Although my orders were to report for duty in Japan I assumed that I might be
diverted or later transferred to Southeast Asia because that was where
the need for qualified neurosurgeons would be the greatest and I would
not be needing this dress blue uniform overseas.
Contemplating the immediate future before leaving for basic training I had read as
much as I could about what to expect during the next two years, the
duration of my military obligation. In civilian training and practice I
had cared for many patients who had suffered injuries to the nervous
system and I knew that I soon would be seeing many more. The four-week
basic training course was rudimentary. There was no need to transform
health professionals into fighting men and women.
There was a fair amount of classroom instruction and studying printed handouts on army rules and regulations.
We marched in formation, carried out physical training drills, ran through
woods at night with compass and map, crawled under barbed wire while
blank tracer bullets were fired overhead. We had a gas mask drill. On
the shooting range we qualified with M-14 rifles. We received
immunizations against smallpox, typhoid, tetanus, typhus, cholera,
yellow fever, influenza, polio, and plague. We went through field
training and exercises at Camp Bullis, the army's 27,000 acre facility.
There was one session spent debriding gunshot wounds on anesthetized goats.
The exercises on these goats reminded me of the fundamental operative
techniques I had taught third year medical students when I was the
Harvey Cushing Fellow in the Hunterian Laboratory at The Johns Hopkins
Hospital.
We learned that the conflict in Vietnam had brought about significant
changes in military medicine since our nation's most recent extended
fighting in Korea. Two major improvements were in aero medical
evacuation and in the mobility of well-staffed and well-equipped
hospital facilities. Combat medical support had to be modified in this
region where the battlefront was ill defined and the guerilla tactics
of the Viet Cong gave the enemy the opportunity to strike deep within
areas once thought to be well under our control.
The UH-l (Huey) helicopter could transport as many as six to nine patients
at one time. Most patients could be evacuated within 30 to 35 minutes
of wounding and the skill and competency of the medics both on the
ground and in flight resulted in salvaging the lives of many soldiers
who would not have survived in earlier conflicts. Before our
involvement in Vietnam came to an end 7,013 Hueys had been deployed in
country. 3,305 were destroyed, 1,074 pilots were killed along with
1,103 other crew members.
A second major change was to be in the deployment of the MUST (Mobile
Unit Self-Contained Transportable) structures that had been developed
to replace the MASH (Mobile Army Surgical Hospital) units of the Korean
conflict.
A prototype of this unit was set up on the base. In the field we were
told that such a hospital could be set up within 25 minutes. With
varied configurations these structures could have a capacity of 200 to
400 beds.
The MUST comprised three basic elements in their own shipping containers
that could be transported by cargo plane, helicopter or ground
transport.
1) The utility element had a multifuel gas turbine engine that supplied
electric power for air-conditioning, refrigeration, heating and
circulation, water heating and pumping, air pressure for the inflatable
elements, and compressed air or suction.
2) A rigid-panel surgical element was expandable with accordion sides.
3) An air-inflatable element with a doubled-walled fabric shelter could
contain wards for patients and other expandables could contain central
supply, laboratory, X-ray, pharmacy and kitchen facilities.
The following are pictures of various MUST components:

Individual containers before assembly

An assembled MUST prototype

The interior of an expandable unit

Central Material Supply with autoclave

X-ray room
The first MUST hospital to arrive in Vietnam had been the 45th Surgical Hospital that was set up in Tay Ninh in October, 1966.
Its commander, Major Gary Wratton, MC, was killed in a mortar attack before the unit began functioning in early November.
In time a total of six MUST hospitals was established in Vietnam.
I had brought along my copy of the NATO Handbook “Emergency War Surgery” that I planned to study before turning in each night.
At Fort Sam the most potentially useful booklet the army gave us was a ninety-four-page publication entitled
“Military Surgical Practices in the United States Army in Vietnam.”
The introduction’s first sentence I recognized as a quotation from the NATO handbook:
“Military
surgery is a development within the art and science of surgery which is
designed to carry out a specialized, essential
and highly significant
mission under the adverse conditions of war.”
Not included in the booklet was the second se entence from the NATO Handbook:
“It is distinctive in that, contrary to the usual medical practice, the care of the individual must necessarily become secondary to the military effort whenever a given tactical situation so demands.” [Emergency War Surgery, NATO Haandbook, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1958, p. 1.]
The initial sentence I remembered from the text that I had first studied as a Halsted intern at The Johns Hopkins Hospital.
The second sentence, omitted in the booklet that we received, troubled
me when I first read it and would continue to trouble me over the next
two years.
I was not alone in my feelings about this subordination of the individual soldier-patient to the military effort
I had earlier read a study of
several thousand army physicians many of whom who had similar
misgivings.
This study of 3,000 army physicians conducted over an eight year period and published early in 1967 included in its summary: “The
most difficult concept for the group to accept was in the area of the
philosophy of military patient care. It appeared to be based upon an
assumed conflict involving principles of medical practice. Most
physicians found it difficult, if not impossible, to accept that their
responsibility might be to an organization rather than the individual
patient. To many of the entering physicians, one of the cardinal
principles of military medicine, namely, ‘The greatest good for the
greatest number,’ was unacceptable.” [Archives of Environmental Health, Volume 14, February, 1967]
My
only extended personal interaction with a single individual during the
month-long introduction to the army was an interview regarding my
future in the military. The interviewing officer explained the
advantages of extending my term of service from two to three years. He
assured me that this would make my posting to Vietnam much less likely.
I could have an assignment at one of the major army hospitals outside
the theater of operations in Southeast Asia. I didn’t bite. I had no
doubt that the needs of the service would determine where I might be
stationed during the three years. My interviewer couldn’t convince me
that the three years in a non-hostile setting could be guaranteed. I
opted to let the army send me where it wished, but I wanted my two-year
obligation to be the total of my service time. I had read enough about
the current conflict to know that the sooner I returned to civilian
life the happier I’d be.
There
was a two-week interval after Fort Sam Houston before my flight from
the West Coast to my assignment in Japan. I returned to Massachusetts
to make arrangements for the army to ship family items overseas and to
rent our house to a colleague who was emigrating from the United
Kingdom to practice medicine in Boston. I had left the family station
wagon in San Antonio and it would be sent overseas in time to arrive in
Japan about the same time as I. Two of my four children were in
elementary school and I explained to them the advantages of living
overseas for two years, and the great opportunities that we would have
contrasted with two years in our Boston suburb. In any event it was
certainly preferable for all of us to be together rather than separated
for these years. Transportation for my wife and four children was
arranged. They would join me in Japan after I had arranged for housing
and schooling for the two older children. In late August I flew to the
west coast and stayed with a fellow medical draftee and his family in
San Francisco before boarding a chartered flight at Travis Air Force
Base midway between San Francisco and Sacramento. We flew to Tokyo with
a refueling stop at Elmendorf Air Base in Alaska. I arrived in Japan in
mid-September and my family joined me in mid-October.
These are a few photos taken on the hospital grounds soon after my reporting for duty:
The
249th General Hospital was located northwest of Tokyo in Asaka
prefecture. This unit was among the nearest complete hospital centers
for army casualties in South Vietnam. We were 2700 miles from military
action. The order of evacuation of the sick and wounded followed an
established protocol. Five echelons of care determined the disposition
of the individual soldier. The exigencies of combat in Vietnam dictated
this evacuation process. Military medical facilities varied in distance
from the combat zone. The nearest U.S. logistical support base was in
Okinawa, ca. 1,800 miles from Saigon. I would serve a short TDY
(temporary tour of duty) stint in Okinawa during my tour of duty. The
nearest complete hospital centers from Saigon were in Japan, 2,700
miles distant. Travis Air Force Base in California was 7,800 miles away
and Andrews Air Force Base outside of Washington D.C. was ca. 9,000
miles away. We would be caring for young soldiers. "The
average age of the American soldier in Vietnam was nineteen, seven
years younger than his father had been in WW II." (Stanley Karnow,
Vietnam: A History, page 26)
One
major difference between practicing neurosurgery in the army and in
civilian life was that the continuing care I could provide patients in
the latter was no longer practicable. Severely wounded soldiers would
pass through the five levels of care. I would be working at the fourth
level where patients could be treated for as long as sixty days if they
could to return to active duty in Vietnam. The men who required longer
hospitalizations would be evacuated to hospitals in the United States -
the fifth level of care. This five-tier system determined where
patients were hospitalized.
The
first echelon: In the combat zone the Medic would render emergency care
and begin evacuation to the forward aid station where a medical officer
would continue care and resuscitation if needful while preparing the
patient for further evacuation to the second echelon (the division
clearing station) or to the third echelon (a definitive treatment
center).
The
second echelon: This is the division clearing station where relatively
minor injuries were treated. More complicated injuries received
continued resuscitation and initial surgery before continued evacuation
to the third echelon, a mobile surgical or evacuation hospital.
The
third echelon: More definitive surgery was available here along with
full resuscitation. This third echelon Surgical Hospital would often
receive the seriously wounded directly from the first echelon, the
combat zone itself or the forward aid station. These seriously wounded
would go directly from the forward aid station to the surgical hospital
as rapidly as practicable. The Evacuation Hospital would receive not
only the soldiers from the aid station but also those needing specialty
surgery from the second echelon division clearing station and patients
already operated on at the Surgical Hospital. Medical and psychiatric
patients also came to the Evacuation Hospital.
The
fourth echelon: These hospitals were based in Japan and Okinawa and
were much like the stateside ones with general surgical and surgical
specialties along with medical and psychiatric facilities. This was the
level at which I would work. These facilities provided care for three
types of patients: 1) Those who might return to duty within sixty days. 2) Those who were so severely wounded that after ongoing care they would be transferred back to the continental United States. 3) Those who were unlikely to survive because of the extent of their wounds and would likely die before reaching home..
The
fifth echelon: These hospitals were located in the Continental United
States and received the men and women who were unlikely to return to
continued service in Vietnam.
In
the combat zone small arms automatic weapons accounted for about
one-third of the injuries and fragmentation missiles, most often from
booby traps, comprised the majority of the others. Most of the
men who reached us at the 249th hospital had been thus injured.
The
pattern of evacuating the wounded by ground that had served in so many
previous conflicts was not practicable in Vietnam. Distances and
hostile terrain necessitated aeromedical support on a scale not before
realized.
Prompt
evacuation of the wounded from the battlefield saved many lives that
would otherwise be lost. The use of the helicopters that had provided
rapid air evacuation on a large scale in the Korean Conflict in the
early 1950's was essential in Nam. It was now possible for a casualty
in Viet Nam to have extensive life-saving surgery within an hour of
being wounded in the field. An advantage of air transport was that it
was often possible for a wounded soldier to be flown directly to the
unit best equipped to care for him, whether that was in the first,
second or third echelon.
During
my tour of duty the number of army hospitals in Vietnam increased to
twenty-three with five thousand, two hundred and eighty-three
beds. In Cam Ranh Bay the 6th Convalescent Center provided care
for men who would be sufficiently fit to return to active duty within
thirty days.
Our
patients reached us from South Vietnam in stages and by progressively
smaller transports. The longest leg of the trip was in C-141 planes
especially outfitted to accommodate not only the most seriously injured
but also those who might be able to return to Vietnam within sixty
days. The C-141s landed at Yakota Air Base and then helicopters would
transfer the most severely injured soldiers while buses and ambulances
would transport the less critically wounded to the general hospitals.
When
I arrived in Japan there were some hectic days of settling in, meeting
the hospital commander and getting acquainted with the hospital
facilities and staff, especially those medics, nurses and doctors with
whom I'd be working on the two neurosurgical wards. Before assuming my
responsibilities on the neurosurgical unit I retrieved and registered
my station wagon that had reached the depot in Yokohama and then
arranged with a local broker to rent a house that I felt could
accommodate my young family for our anticipated stay of two years. The
house was some distance from the hospital - a commute of one and one
-half hours on the congested Tokyo roads but only a few blocks from the
bus stop where a commuter bus from the American School in Japan would
pick up and deliver our two school age children.
It
would be one month before my family's arrival in Japan. By then I was
settled into the hospital routine and was immersed in the challenges of
caring for the quantity and variety of injured soldiers who had reached
the fourth echelon of care at our hospital. Our two wards could accommodate eighty soldiers. For any overflow we could find beds on other wards.
My
reading in anticipation of military service had raised some strong
feelings about our role in the conflict in Southeast Asia and it did
not take long for me to feel that we were sacrificing brave young men
in an ill-advised adventure far from our own shores. As I made rounds
on our wards, treated the continuing stream of casualties that passed
through our operating rooms and pronounced dead so many soldiers who
had been grievously wounded in combat I resolved to do what I could do
to end the carnage. I was enough of a realist to know that while I was
on active duty there was nothing I could do but strive to do the very
best that training and experience had taught me. I would treat, comfort
and whenever possible restore to some semblance of well-being those who
came under my care. However, I knew my own tour of duty in the army
would last for only the mandatory two years, and if the war had not
ended when I was discharged then I would do what I could to help end
it. How I would do that I did not know, but I did know that it must end.
[From Washington Post - 04/30/2017: The
year 1967 saw the deaths of 11,400 Americans, and 1968 claimed 16,900,
the worst yearly toll of the war, according to the National Archives. These
two years account for almost half the 58,307 names on the Vietnam
Veterans Memorial in Washington, which honors those killed in the war.]
Early
on I purchased at the Tachikawa Airbase PX a 35 millimeter Nikon FTN
camera that I kept close at hand and recorded much of what I
experienced both on and off base. Towards the end of my tour I gave a
slide presentation of my impressions and thoughts to my colleagues at a
Grand Rounds session. Choosing which slides to show from the hundreds
that I had by then accumulated was difficult. There were no objections
to the efforts of myself and those who wanted to see an end to our
involvement in Nam but the highest ranking attendee, a career colonel,
adamantly refused to join the post-presentation discussion of what he
considered to be a political issue.
A partial view of our ward with trapeze and safety rails on almost all beds.
Nurse
and physician caring for a paraplegic patient on a Stryker frame,
enabling the patient to be rotated 180 degrees frequently in order to
prevent skin breakdown and the formation of bed sores.
View of patients in beds with safety rails and CircOlectric beds in background.
A nurse caring for a paraplegic patient on a CircOlectric bed.
Two nurses with recovering patient.
Two general surgeons consulting on one of our patients.
In the neurosurgical operating room.
The
249th General Hospital was not so very different from the major
hospitals where I had received my general and neurosurgical training in
the States. Both health professional draftees and career army officers
represented the various specialties. The medical staff consisted of
captains, majors and colonels with the rank determined by degree of
training and experience. The nurses who were the closest to the
continuing oversight and care of the patients were drawn from both
military and civilian lives. Assignments of the doctors on the
neurosurgical wards overlapped so that there was sufficient time for
the outgoing surgeons to orient the newcomers to the individual
patients and their clinical situations. Our two wards at the 249th had
two fully trained neurosurgeons and two medical officers attending the
patients throughout my tour. The chief of service was a major who would
be promoted to lieutenant colonel during the tour, and I began with the
rank of captain to be promoted to major. Two captains completed the
physicians' staffing on our unit. The military nursing staff on our
wards contained lieutenants and captains. There were also a number of
civilian nurses, spouses of active duty military personnel who were
stationed in Japan. The medics varied in rank. The census on our
wards during most of my tour varied between sixty and eighty patients.
The
soldiers on our neurosurgical wards often had injuries that extended
beyond the nervous system. Many of these patients had sustained
multiple fragment wounds from high-velocity missiles, land mines, booby
traps, and mortars. They had received excellent initial and ongoing
care in Vietnam before evacuation to Japan. By the spring of 1967, when
I received my draft notice, there were ten neurosurgeons operating at
the five army hospitals in the combat zone. In addition all the medical
and surgical specialties were available for acute care in country. The
quality of care available to the wounded soldier was superior to that
in any previous conflict in large measure due to the talents of the
skilled medical/surgical staff and the supporting team members and
facilities.
The
majority of our patients would not be returning to active duty in the
combat zone within the allotted sixty days and therefore much of our
work was devoted to repairing and stabilizing wounds and preparing
patients for evacuation and the return home to the fifth echelon of
care. For most of these returning men the war was over. The long-term
effects of the conflict and their residual deficits would not be over.
The
pace and stress accompanying our workload varied with the progress of
hostilities in Vietnam as most of our days and nights were centered on
the tasks at hand. We concentrated on admitting and evaluating patients
as they arrived at the hospital from the C-141 transport planes that
had evacuated them from Nam. Our assignment was to provide continued
surgical treatment in our operating rooms, and then prepare them for
further evacuation back to the States or, in fewer cases, back to
active duty in Southeast Asia. It was years later when I could
correlate the conditions that obtained in the combat zones with what we
were witnessing in our hospital. It was not until 1972, three years
after my tour of duty, that I went to work in Vietnam and saw first
hand some of the results of our intervention..
The
soldiers who reached our hospital presented many of the same challenges
that I had encountered and treated in civilian life but the extent,
variety and devastation of injuries far exceeded what I had encountered
in my previous years of residency and practice.
We
were not the first neurosurgeons to care for our patients. The majority
of soldiers whom we treated after evacuation from Southeast Asia had
injuries that required additional cranial or spinal surgery before
continued transport to the continental United States. Rarely would
these men be returning to active duty in Nam. Now and then we could
chuckle at our circumstances and those of our patients. One such event
was the evacuation from South Vietnam of a soldier who had no injury
but had gone through induction, training and deployment to Vietnam
despite lacking a significant portion of his skull. One quarter of the
bony protection of his skull had been removed following an adolescent
injury and this had never been replaced. The scalp was well healed and
he was in fine physical shape, but the skull defect and the underlying
pulsating brain were prominent. The private enjoyed a few weeks of
unanticipated rest and relaxation after the replacement of the defect
with a methylmethacrylate plate insertion. Then he was back to fight
another day.
During
my tour of duty military actions in Nam and events at home occurred
that were to influence the course of the hostilities and eventually the
departure of our own troops from South Vietnam. At the end of 1967
American troops in country numbered 485,600. Total deaths of U.S.
troops in the "Vietnam War" had reached 19,562. General Westmoreland
had started to fortify Khe Sanh, the linchpin of the contemplated
electronic barrier monitoring infiltration from the north. Anti-war
protests were escalating at home. Our workload at the hospital followed
a routine - regular arrivals from the airbases, helicopter or ambulance
transfer to our wards, triage, evaluation, observation, pre-operative
treatment, surgery as needed, post-operative care and preparation for
continued evacuation to the continental United States or occasionally
back to the combat zone.
The
years of 1967 and 1968 were pivotal as events unfolded both at home and
in Vietnam. Although what was happening on the "home front" had little
impact on our daily activities the battles in Nam did. On October 21,
1967 there was a march on the Pentagon that brought out 100,000 antiwar
protesters. In November there were heavy casualties in fighting around
Dak To in the Central Highlands. That same month the Secretary of
Defense, Robert McNamara, who was having misgivings about our
involvement, resigned. A day later Senator Eugene McCarthy, who had
long opposed the war, began a challenge to President Johnson for the
presidential nomination in 1968. Anti-war protests increased.
The Tet Offensive began on January 31, 1968.
Our
workload had been steady and heavy up to Tet when it increased with the
escalation of hostilities. Each year from 1965 had brought greater
numbers of army patients evacuated from Vietnam. 1965 - 10,164 1966 - 12,606 1967 - 22,702 1968
- 35,391 (with the greatest number yet recorded in a single month -
3,576 in the month of February during the Tet Offensive) 1969 - 35,916 [Medical
Support of the U.S. Army in Vietnam, 1965-1970 by Major General
Spurgeon Neel, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 1973, page
77 Source:
Army Medical Service Activities Report, MACV, 1965; Army Medical
Service Activities Reports, 44th Medical Brigade, 1966, 1967, 968,
1969.]
Belatedly, but happily, after 1969 a gradual de-escalation of our nation's combat role in Vietnam began.
Before
then General Westmoreland had requested 206,000 more troops. Clark
Clifford, who had succeeded the unhappy Robert McNamara as Secretary of
Defense advised against this buildup and President Johnson concurred.
1968 was an election year and antiwar protests were increasing. On
March 12 in New Hampshire's Democratic primary Eugene McCarthy received
42% of the vote. On March 16 Robert Kennedy announced his candidacy for
president. Creighton Abrams replaced Westmoreland in Vietnam and the
latter was appointed Army Chief of Staff.
We
knew about the unrest at home. In early November, 1968 I accompanied a
critically ill soldier from the 249th to Walter Reed Hospital. Passing
through the streets of Washington I saw the lingering results of the
rioting and destruction that had followed Martin Luther King's
assassination in April. One thousand, one hundred, ninety-nine
buildings had been badly damaged or destroyed. Many remained abandoned
and boarded up. Over one thousand citizens had been injured. Twelve had
been killed. To combat the unrest and looting the White House had
dispatched some 13,600 federal troops. That occupation of Washington
was the largest of any American city since the Civil War. How ironic
that our marines had deployed machine guns on the steps of the capitol
while their comrades in arms were fighting for their lives halfway
across the world!
In
Japan the census in the medical and surgical services remained high.
The flow of head, spine and peripheral nerve injuries continued. Many
of the spinal injuries we encountered brought new experiences. I had
previously operated up and down the spine in what were textbook
situations: disc disease, fractures of the vertebral column, tumors,
neonatal deformities, vascular anomalies, degenerative disease, but our
patients returning from combat presented new and unique challenges.
Closed
wounds of the spine were less frequent than open ones. The former
usually resulted from helicopter crashes or explosions below vehicles.
The latter, caused by penetrating missiles, were more common and more
complicated because of associated injuries to other parts of the body.
In
the combat zone life-threatening wounds frequently mandated the
treatment of associated chest or abdominal trauma that took precedence
over surgical intervention at the spinal column. When many such
patients reached us the medical and surgical hurdles were unique.
Some
patients who had lost movement and sensation in their lower bodies
arrived with extensive breakdown of their skin and muscle below the
site of injury. These pressure or decubitus ulcers were often infected
and required removal of gangrenous tissue, frequent cleansing, Betadine
(povidone-iodine) applications and dressing changes. Skin grafts or
flaps were necessary in many of the more extensive wounds and further
surgical procedures would often be deferred until evacuation back to
the States.
Necrotic decubitus ulcer
Deep wound of low back
Removing infected vertebral body from soldier's back
Necrotic vertebral body now freed from back and surrounding infected site
Exposed spinal nerves and nerve roots of the cauda equina (Latin for "horse's tail") in an open low back wound
As
previously noted The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall in 2018 listed
58,320 names. The names of the 3 million Vietnamese who perished in the
conflict have no such wall, but as Philip Jones Griffiths, the renowned
photographer of the conflict, observed, "Everyone
should know one simple statistic: the Washington, D.C. memorial to the
American war dead is 150 yards long; if a similar monument were built
with the same density of names of the Vietnamese who died in it, [it]
would be nine miles long." (Messer,
William, "Presence of Mind: The Photographs of Philip Jones Griffiths,"
Aperture No. 190 (2008), http://www.aperture.org/jonesgriffiths/)
Some
of our patients were doomed to die before further transport could be
attempted. However, a greater number were ultimately sufficiently
stabilized to allow transfer to stateside hospitals where the prognoses
for meaningful recovery for a large number were unhappily exceedingly
bleak. We did not lose many patients whose wounds were below the head.
Even those men with extensive associated injuries involving the chest,
abdomen and limbs in addition to the spine could often be treated and
stabilized before further evacuation.
The
causes of wounds in Vietnam reflected the increased use of small arms
and automatic weapons contrasted with the earlier experiences of World
War II and the Korean Conflict. In these earlier engagements about 75
per cent of all wounds were attributed to missile fragment wounds from
artillery, mortar and aerial bombs. In Vietnam such missile wounds made
up 49.6 per cent of injuries while gunshot wounds made up 42.7 per cent
(Military Surgical Practices of the United States Army in Viet Nam,
Medical Field Service School, Brooke Army Medical Center, Fort Sam
Houston, Texas, 1966 by Yearbook Medical Publishers, Inc.).
Soldier with multiple fragment wounds of back and buttock
Bilateral lower limb injuries necessitating further revision of amputation stumps
Leg amputation
Multiple fragment wounds with loss of right lower leg
Gunshot wound to head with breakdown of scalp closure
Scalp breakdown following debridement of infected entry sites over the skull of a soldier who had sustained multiple fragment wounds
Death after uncontrollable generalized infection of brain
Disruption of base of skull after devastating facial and sinus missile injury
On
January 30, 1968 the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese began the Tet
Offensive and the next few weeks were the busiest of my tour of duty.
During the second week in February the 543 Americans killed in action
marked the highest weekly total of the war. The soldiers had the
support of 116 air ambulance detachments. Five to seven Huey
helicopters were assigned to each detachment and they could carry six
to nine casualties on one flight. On average
the wounded often reached a surgical unit within thirty-five
minutes. That the men who survived to reach a hospital survived
in over ninety-seven percent of cases was a testament to the medevac
crews' skill, heroism and devotion.
Thirty-nine
crew members were killed and two hundred-ten were wounded in a two-year
period as they flew rescue missions [Neel, page 73]. The number
of flights increased in proportion to our escalating involvement.
1965 - 13,004, 1966 - 76,910, 1967 - 85,804, and in 1969 - 206,229
[Neel - page 75]. In 1969 hoist retrievals of casualties by
dust-off helicopters rescued 2,516 patients [Neel - page
75].
As
the numbers of wounded reaching our hospital escalated my determination
to do whatever I could to protest the enormity of the conflict became
an obsession. I had to wait until September, 1969.
In
contrast to the hospital environment and ongoing care of casualties
life away from the base provided a welcome respite. Our home for the
overseas years was a classic Japanese house, a wooden structure of two
stories and much like what I had come to expect from my preparatory
reading in anticipation of the move. With the help of colleagues at the
hospital I had found live-in help, a young woman who had a fair command
of English and whom I hoped would make the transition for my family as
easy as possible.
My
wife, four children and one beagle arrived in mid-October and I
introduced them to what would be somewhat less than two years in this
country. I would likely be at home even less than when I had been in
private practice. In Framingham I lived within fifteen minutes of my
office and hospital. The longer commute and the responsibilities of
treating wartime casualties would likely result in my having not much
time at home. I was thinking that the relatively comfortable and
somewhat exotic living arrangements, the presence of live-in help and
the opportunity for the older children to attend school with a group of
international students would help in this transition. There would
certainly be new experiences. Living in a home with movable Shoji
screens for walls, tatami mats for flooring, sleeping on futons that
would be folded for storage each morning. The wooden components of the
house were Japanese cypress. The fenced-in garden allowed a safe place
for the children to play and our beagle Tammy to run. Our full-sized
Ford station wagon could fit in a detached garage that was constructed
of sturdy plastic walls and a corrugated roof. One of the many
novelties was the deep cedar tub that afforded us the unique Japanese
bathing ritual. Food stalls and shops were less than one hundred yards
down the street as was the local railroad station with direct service
to downtown Tokyo. 218 Karasuyama, Setagaya-ku was to be our home for
most of the next two years.
Directly
across the street from our home was a Shinto shrine. During
comparatively "quiet" periods at the hospital we were able to visit
sundry Shinto shrines and Buddhist temples while exploring further
afield.
The
majority of my days was spent at the hospital but there were also
opportunities to take advantage of free hours and vacation days to
explore some of the attractions of not only Tokyo but also of other
parts of the country. It was a long two years and much of my work was
necessarily heart-wrenching. The respite from the hospital activities
was welcome and there was much to see and value about this country that
I would never had had the opportunity to appreciate were it not for the
ongoing hostilities in Nam. Needless to say, I would have gladly
forgone the adventures of traveling in this land had there been no
conflict responsible for bringing us here.
Temples in Kyoto:
The Temple of the Golden Pavilion (Kinkakuji) in northern Kyoto:
The Great Buddha of Kamakura, over 37 feet high, cast in 1252:
Cherry blossoms in Ueno Park:
A chance to picnic:
Kite flying:
TV before bedtime:
Bath time in a ryokan, a traditional Japanese inn
Hear no evil, speak no evil, see no evil
During
the same period that we were working in Japan the conflict and military
activities in Nam itself occupied most of the news. Much of what was
happening during that time I learned only after retiring from active
duty. Journal articles and books appeared with increasing frequency as
we slowly reduced our commitment to the South Vietnamese government.
General Westmoreland assigned Major General Spurgeon Neel the task of
preparing a monograph of the army's medical activities in Vietnam for
the years 1965-1970. It was from this monograph, Medical Support of the
U.S. Army in Vietnam, 1965-1970, that I came to more clearly understand
the challenges that faced our troops and the physicians tasked with
their care in the combat zone during those years.
After
leaving active duty in 1969 I returned to the practice of civilian
neurosurgery in Massachusetts, but I continued to closely follow the
news from SouthEast Asia and became increasingly active in opposing our
continued military activities in Vietnam. I presented my impressions
and slide presentations on TV stations in Boston, New York and
Baltimore and college campuses both locally and as distant as Kansas
City, Missouri. On December 7, 1970, thirty-nine years after "a date
which will live in infamy" the University Program Council Lecture
Committee at The University of Missouri-Kansas City sponsored my slide
presentation. The campus magazine quoted one of the more telling points
of this talk, the fact that had continued to disturb me as the
hostilities continued: "81
per cent of the Vietnam War's wounded survive. Although this is an
improvement over previous wars, there will be three times as many men
who are totally disabled as there were in World War II."
I
shared a platform with Ramsey Clark in Chicago at a meeting of Business
Executives Move for Vietnam Peace. I presented facts and figures to
colleagues at meetings of The Massachusetts Medical Society and the New
England Neurosurgical Society.
By
the end of 1971 56,205 U.S. troops had been killed in the Vietnam War.
In our country opposition to the war continued. On March 23rd of 1972
the United States suspended the Peace Talks in Paris, and a week later
the North Vietnamese began a new offensive, the heaviest since 1968.
The next month saw the initiation of Operation Linebacker, expanding
air strikes against the North Vietnamese fighters in South Vietnam.
During these same months, sponsored by the Agency for International
Development of the Department of State, I was in Vietnam.
I
had traveled to South Vietnam to see for myself not only the results of
our ongoing intervention in country but also the conditions under which
medical teams tried to deliver care to the large numbers of sick and
wounded. I worked primarily in Saigon as a Visiting Neurosurgeon at the
Cho Ray Hospital and Lecturer in Neurosurgery at the medical school,
but was also able to travel further afield to military and civilian
medical facilities in Pleiku, Kontum and Nha Trang.
Scenes from The Cho Ray Hospital in Saigon - the unit in which I spent the most of my time.
Patients lining the corridors waiting to be seen
Three infants - one crib
A representative ward
Two nursing instructors

Nurses and student nurses - 1

Nurses and student nurses - 2
Child with scalp wound
Child recovering from head wound
Wound care
Despite
the wartime conditions education of young doctors and ancillary health
professionals continued at the medical school and hospital with
conferences, bedside rounds, x-ray review sessions and anatomical
studies, including "brain cutting" as in training programs throughout
the world. Operating rooms functioned with state of the art equipment,
facilitated by contributions from around the world.
Conference and review of skull x-rays

"Brain cutting" demonstration

Operating room

Operating room during cranial surgery; overhead lights provided by The Republic of South Korea

Contrasting technologies - from a state of the art operating room to an abrasive wheel for re-sharpening metal intravenous needles.
Entrance to military hospital

Grounds of the Cong Hoa army hospital in Saigon
Audience of army doctors as we discuss neurosurgical challenges in wartime
Entrance to children's hospital
Outside the hospital I spent as much time as I could exploring Saigon, visiting
the orphanages and schools, photographing street scenes and contrasting
how removed from life in the hospitals and rehabilitation units were
the everyday activities in the capital city. Striking were the smiles
and cheerfulness of the children, especially the younger ones.

Saigon Orphanage
A few pictures from Kontum in the Central Highlands:

An army helicopter about to transfer patients from Kontum to the next echelon of care

Performing a lumbar puncture while Montagnard tribesmen observe
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